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INTRODUCTION 
Two separate and distinct movements have colonized research in the 
field of intellectual property.  The law and economics movement has 
deepened our understanding of the justification for granting monopoly 
rights over intellectual property; in more recent years, theories in the 
movement have been used to support the growth of the commons—the 
free environment where intellectual property plays little role in 
generating new creative works and innovation.  The second movement 
is the law and technology movement that has sought to increase 
understanding of intellectual property through the exploration of how 
technologies either provide freedoms or impose limitations on how 
creative works and innovation are created and received by society. 
The advent of the information age and the infiltration of the Internet 
into our homes have allowed the ordinary citizen to participate in the 
process of creating new literary and artistic works and distributing those 
works across channels opened by new technologies.  Scientific research 
takes on a completely different meaning as new technologies allow 
DNA sequences to be analyzed through complex three-dimensional 
computer generated models.1  This movement has increased our 
understanding of the legal dimensions of new technologies and the 
effect these technologies have on society, whether in real life or online.  
The impact of these two movements on many fields of law has increased 
our understanding of the law of intellectual property and its effect on 
society.  One thing is clear from the literature:  a balance must be 
achieved between incentives to produce for the creator of a work and 
access to information, knowledge, and content by the users. 
Applied to copyright law, the combined jurisprudence of law and 
economics and law and technology provides insight into addressing the 
balance between private rights and public interest.  The main issue 
facing copyright law—the extent to which public access to creative 
works may be the underlying rationale for the imposition of limitations 
upon the reach of copyright law, particularly in an age where access to 
information and knowledge is facilitated by technology—arises from 
constitutional intent.  As outlined in the U.S. Constitution, authors are 
to have exclusive rights to their writings to promote the progress of arts.2  
 
 1. See Richard Wright, Computer Graphics as Allegorical Knowledge:  Electronic 
Imagery in the Sciences, 3 LEONARDO (SUPP. ISSUE) 65 (1990). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 8.  The U.S. Constitution gives “Congress . . . [the] 
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  
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Implicit in this is the notion that the ultimate aim of the grant of 
monopoly rights is the progress of arts for the greater benefit of society.3  
One historical underpinning of the development of copyright law was to 
encourage learning4—this was done by rewarding authors for using their 
talents to the ultimate benefit of the public.5  The grant of the copyright 
monopoly was the most efficient way to enhance pubic welfare through 
the works of authors.6 
Law and economics jurisprudence does not provide compelling 
arguments to support the notion that the copyright monopoly is the 
most efficient way to maximize public welfare by promoting the works 
of authors.  In fact, Justice Stephen Breyer, in his tenure piece at 
Harvard Law School, entitled The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study 
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs,7 argues 
that the economic justification for granting rights to authors to 
encourage authorship cannot be proven.8  However, economic theories 
 
Id. 
 3. MELVILLE B. NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT AND 
OTHER ASPECTS OF ENTERTAINMENT LITIGATION:  INCLUDING UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
DEFAMATION, PRIVACY 30 (6th ed. 2000). 
The authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright 
is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative 
activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condition to the 
full realization of such creative activities.  Implicit in this rationale is the assumption 
that in the absence of such public benefit the grant of a copyright monopoly to 
individuals would be unjustified. 
Id. 
 4. The Statute of Anne, the first copyright law, was enacted as “[a]n Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or 
Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned.”  Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 5. Chief Justice Hughes identified the primary purpose for the grant of a copyright 
monopoly as residing “in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of 
authors.”  Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).  A copyright serves as both “the 
equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skills 
of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.”  Id. at 127–
28. 
 6. The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein alluded to this point and stated that “[t]he 
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant . . . copyrights is the 
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to 
advance public welfare through the talents of authors.”  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954). 
 7. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). 
 8. Id. at 322.  Professor Breyer, as he then was, argued that exclusive rights under 
copyright only minimally contributed toward increasing the volume of literary production, 
especially of books.  Id. at 283–84. 
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regarding the creation of market externalities, the causes for market 
failures, and the correction of market inefficiencies provide evidence in 
support of retaining the copyright system as the means of correcting 
these market failures and inefficiencies and to encourage authorship.9  
The theories suggest the need for copyright law to achieve the balance 
between private rights and public welfare as well as individual rights and 
collective freedoms in situations where the market for information 
goods is certainly going to be inefficient.10  More importantly, these 
theories identify copyright’s role in correcting market inefficiencies.11  
The law’s expansion in the last three decades has had no adverse effect 
on public welfare because the expansion of the law has not imposed 
additional social costs.12  The social cost from the expansion of these 
private rights is nonexistent because market structures change as 
technologies develop, providing society with increased accessibility to 
creative works.13  Copyright laws must expand as technology develops to 
achieve a fair balance between private rights and public interests. 
 
 9. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–12 (1982).  
Professor Wendy Gordon explains that “[e]conomists ordinarily characterize intellectual 
property law as an effort to cure a form of market failure stemming from the presence of 
‘public goods’ characteristics.”  Id. at 1610.  There are two characteristics that define public 
goods:  (1) they are non-rivalrous in that one person’s consumption of the good does not 
reduce another person’s ability to consume the good, and (2) they are nonexclusive in that it 
is not possible for any one consumer to exclude others from consuming the good.  These 
characteristics of public goods would cause them to be underproduced if left to the private 
market because free riding will occur.  According to Professor Gordon, copyright law allows a 
market for intellectual property to function by providing a means to exclude non-purchasers 
through the special property rights that authors have to sell physical copies of their works 
while retaining legal control over certain uses of the works.  See id. at 1610–12. 
 10. Id. at 1612–13.  Professor Gordon explains that copyright law allows consensual 
market transfers to take place through the copyright notice requirement, registration system, 
criminal sanctions, and statutory damages provisions.  Id.  Consensual markets for 
copyrighted goods are facilitated in four ways through the law:  property rights, lower 
transaction costs, provision of valuable information, and mechanisms of enforcement. 
 11. Id. at 1626.  Professor Gordon argues that fair use is an appropriate judicial 
response to market failures when consensual bargains cannot effectively occur between the 
copyright holder and user of the work.  Id. at 1627–35.  The market for literary and artistic 
works may breakdown through the creation of market barriers as a result of new 
technologies, the presence of externalities, non-monetary interests, and noncommercial 
activities as well as anti-dissemination motives to control the flow of information. 
 12. See J. Miles Hanisee, Comment, An Economic View of Innovation and Property 
Right Protection in the Expanded Regulatory State, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 127, 158–59 (1993).  
Rather, the expansion of the law was necessary to allow technological progression to occur.  
A system of compensation for the risks involved in developing new technologies should be 
undertaken by society to ensure continuous technological advancement. 
 13. Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse:  The Expanding Boundaries of 
NG ARTICLE  
2007] COPYRIGHT’S EMPIRE 341 
 
In recent years, law and technology literature has demonstrated that 
other factors should be taken into account in making a case for 
copyright law, and one of these factors is the role technology plays in 
shifting the balance of control of creative works from authors to users.  
Users are greatly empowered by digital technologies to reuse and 
rebuild creative works, and the use of technology may strategically alter 
how works are created and used.  In Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace, Professor Lawrence Lessig argues that architecture built 
into the Internet may provide perfect control over activities that occur 
online through the use of codes.14  Codes give authors the opportunity to 
control the use of their intellectual property independent of copyright 
law.15  One example of these codes is a trusted system that provides 
creators of creative works maximum control over how their works are 
used when these works are made available online.16  The use of 
technology can further restrict society’s use of free ideas from common 
resources.  Content on the Internet, for example, can be controlled 
through the use of technology by copyright owners in such a way that 
 
Intellectual Property Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 25 (2004). 
[N]o matter how revolutionary technological advancements may be, the laws of 
supply and demand and the theoretical framework of external effects apply to 
technological change in the same manner they do to any other shift in relative costs 
caused by exogenous changes. . . . In the context of cyberspace, intellectual property 
law allows content providers to internalize the commercial strategy between 
authored works and new technological means of distribution and presentation of 
information. 
Id.  According to Professor Depoorter, “[d]igital technologies ‘break through the functional 
rigidities of print media by providing users with extraction tools . . . to sort and arrange data 
in ways meaningful to them.’  Modern technology can turn incoherent data into meaningful 
and valuable information.”  Id. at 27 (quoting J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, 
Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 65 (1997)). 
 14. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999).  
According to Professor Lessig, 
[i]n real space we recognize how laws regulate—through constitutions, statutes and 
other legal codes.  In cyberspace we must understand how code regulates—how the 
software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace as it is.  
As William Mitchell puts it, this code is cyberspace’s “law.” 
Id. 
 15. See id. at 135. 
 16. See id. 
Trusted systems regulate in the same domain where copyright law regulates, but 
unlike copyright law, they do not guarantee the same public use protection.  Trusted 
systems give the producer maximum control—admittedly at a cheaper cost, thus 
permitting many more authors to publish.  But they give authors more control 
(either to charge for or limit use) in an area where the law gave less than perfect 
control. 
Id. 
NG ARTICLE  
342 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
creativity and innovation cannot freely occur.17  Our ability to build and 
shape our culture may also be affected as technology develops to 
provide creators with the ability to control how content is used and 
decide the sort of content that we receive as a society.18  The capacity 
that technologies provide to authors of creative works to displace the 
balance of copyright law and shape how works are used by society 
evidences that the balance intended to be achieved through copyright 
law is lost.19  This Article considers the effect of technology on the 
accessibility of creative works and suggests that such effects provide 
many reasons to look to copyright law to provide a balance between 
private rights and public interests that would not ordinarily exist without 
such a system. 
For purposes of analysis, these theories are applied in the context of 
a relatable example.  In a novel about hobbits, goblins, and fantasy, 
entitled The Hobbit, J.R.R. Tolkien conceived of the idea for a greater 
work that would draw on the foundation of all his previous works.20  
This idea was realized in the creation of Tolkien’s greatest work, The 
Lord of the Rings, which was built upon his many smaller works.21  The 
novel’s adaptation into three blockbuster films,22 a soundtrack,23 and a 
 
 17. According to Professor Lessig, the Internet makes two things possible.  First, 
through the deployment of proper codes, it is possible “to control the use of copyrighted 
material much more fully than was possible before the Internet.”  LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE 
FUTURE OF IDEAS:  THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 200 (2001).  
Second, the concentration of media power is threatened by the availability of new 
technologies over the Internet that open up new channels for production and distribution of 
content.  See id. 
 18. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 173 (2004). 
In response to a real, if not yet quantified, threat that the technologies of the 
Internet present to twentieth-century business models for producing and distributing 
culture, the law and technology are being transformed in a way that will undermine 
our tradition of free culture.  The property right that is copyright is no longer the 
balanced right that it was, or intended to be. 
Id. 
 19. Id. at 172–73. 
 20. MICHAEL WHITE, TOLKIEN:  A BIOGRAPHY 147 (2001). 
 21. Id. at 183. 
 22. See Official Lord of the Rings Movie Homepage, http://www.lordoftherings.net/ 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 23. See The Lord of the Rings:  The Complete Recordings, http://www.lordoftherings-
soundtrack.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).  For a complete review and analysis of the 
soundtrack, see Lord of the Rings Soundtrack Analysis and Review, http://www.lotrsound 
track.com/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
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video game24 illustrates the entire spectrum of copyright’s empire and 
the balance that must be achieved between private rights and the public 
interest.  More importantly, Tolkien’s success demonstrates the 
economic incentives that drive the production of creative works.  
Producers of creative works rely on property rights as a surety that their 
investments in producing works are recovered.  Thus, one could 
conclude the following:  law and economic jurisprudence evidences that 
the social cost of the grant of intellectual property rights to creators is 
always dependent on the benefit that accrues to society to enjoy the 
works as new technologies develop.  The expansion of rights should be 
allowed if the impact of the expanded rights on society is marginal.  Law 
and technology jurisprudence has shown that technology can always be 
used to displace the balance that copyright law seeks to achieve.25  In 
order “[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts,” 
authors and inventors must be given exclusive rights in “their respective 
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”26  Private rights ordering alone will not 
achieve the balance between private rights and the public interest.  In 
conclusion, this author argues that copyright’s empire—the institution 
that is intended to encourage authorship to ultimately serve the public 
interest—must be built upon a firm foundation of law.  It is only through 
law that the proper conditions for authorship can exist for the ultimate 
benefit of society. 
I.  LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS IN COPYRIGHT 
The traditional justification for copyright law, based on law and 
economics reasoning, relies upon the rationale that a temporary 
monopoly right is necessary to encourage authorship to ultimately 
benefit society as a whole.27  The grant of a temporary monopoly over 
literary and artistic works serves a utilitarian purpose to “stimulate 
production of the widest possible variety of creative goods at the lowest 
possible price.”28  The first copyright statute, enacted in England in 1710 
to put an end to the booksellers’ monopoly over the book trade, 
 
 24. See The Lord of the Rings Online:  Shadows of Angmar, http://lotro.turbine.com/ 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 25. LESSIG, supra note 18, at 173. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 27. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 
127–28 (1932). 
 28. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT:  PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND 
PRACTICE 3 (2001). 
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displays this early thread of utilitarianism in copyright law.29  The 
Statute of Anne, enacted as an “[a]ct for the encouragement of learning, 
by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of 
such copies, during the times therein mentioned,” forms the historical 
basis for most copyright legislation in common law countries.30  The 
utilitarian basis for copyright protection is also evident in the U.S. 
Constitution, which grants Congress the authority to enact legislation to 
afford authors exclusive rights in their works in order to promote the 
greater good of progress in arts and sciences.31  The enactment of the 
first copyright legislation in the United States in 1790, indeed, reflects 
this intent to promote general societal development, and outlines the 
purpose of the enactment as being “for the encouragement of learning 
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books to the authors and 
proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”32 
The development of the law of intellectual property has given 
scholars and practitioners a reason to further understand and increase 
scholarship in the field.  The law of real property has been used to 
justify the intellectual property owner’s right to exclude society from 
using the work without prior permission.33  The economics behind this 
right to exclude are effectuated by allowing the creator of a work to 
recover investments made in producing the work.  In this way, creators 
of intellectual property are allowed to recover the benefits that society 
receives from the creation of the work by exercising the exclusive rights 
that the authors have as a result of their intellectual property rights.  
Professor Edmund Kitch has observed that one oversight that many 
scholars and commentators make about the right to exclude society 
from using a protected work in ways that have not been permitted by 
the right owner is that protection of intellectual property rights may 
 
 29. Id. at 5–6. 
 30. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); see GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 28, at 3.  According to Professor Goldstein, “the ideal copyright legislator will test 
every proposal to extend copyright against the criterion of utility and will vote for the 
proposed extension only if it is demonstrably necessary to stimulate the creation of new 
works.”  GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 3. 
 31. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 6 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 32. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1831). 
 33. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 471, 484–95 (2003).  In this article, the authors argue that economic justifications 
for recognizing property rights in public goods apply equally to intellectual property to 
prevent diminishing value in a work and encourage continued investments in marketing, 
developing, and renewing works.  See generally id.  Property rights are necessary in 
intellectual property to prevent the inefficiencies that would occur from overuse of goods that 
are freely available and accessible to the public. 
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provide the right owner with an economic monopoly over the work.34  
Monopolies over works, however, are separate and distinct from 
property rights in works.35  A right to exclude others from using the 
work is not the same as an economic monopoly to control competition 
in a free market place.36 
Professor Kitch is correct to the extent that the use of the term 
“monopoly” to describe the control an intellectual property right owner 
has over the work suggests a market for content that has only one 
producer or seller.  For copyrighted works, use of the term monopoly 
conveys the ability of an individual copyright producer to exclude 
market competition by the sole fact that the copyright owner becomes 
the market for the good and is in complete control of the amount of 
output of content offered for sale to the public.37  However, for content, 
the market is significantly different because competition may enter a 
market with a product developed from the idea underlying the original 
work.38  The markets for literary and artistic works rarely produce 
monopolies in the economic sense because competitors are free to 
 
 34. Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of 
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1729 (2000). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1734–36. 
From an economic point of view, “property” and “monopoly” have almost nothing 
to do with each other.  A seller who owns his wares has property but no monopoly if 
many other people independently sell similar things in the same market.  A seller 
who can control the price of what he sells, because no one seriously competes with 
him in the market, has a monopoly but not property if he does not own what he 
sells. 
Id. at 1735 (quoting S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 
53 (Comm. Print 1958)). 
 37. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 328 (5th ed. 
2001).  According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld, “[i]f the monopolist decides to raise the price of 
the product, it need not worry about competitors who, by charging lower prices, would 
capture a larger share of the market at the monopolist’s expense.  The monopolist is the 
market and completely controls the amount of output offered for sale.”  Id. 
 38. The U.S. Copyright Act states that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  In Mazer v. Stein, for 
example, the Supreme Court decided that a copyright existed in statuettes but not in the idea 
of using the statuette as a base for a table lamp.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).  In 
Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court decided that copyright protected an author’s explanation 
for a bookkeeping method but not the method, itself.  Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 
(1879).  In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
decided that a copyright in a play did not extend to the underlying ideas and themes of the 
play.  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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create competing products with the same underlying features.  A 
“monopoly” over works of intellectual property is, therefore, more 
commonly understood to convey control over works or some property 
rights in the works, themselves—that is, rights that enable owners to 
define the scope of the rights and prevent society from using the works. 
The recognition of property rights in works is granted to exclude 
others from an overuse of intellectual resources and to internalize 
market externalities.  The most often cited work to support a theory of 
property in this field is Garrett Hardin’s 1968 paper, entitled The 
Tragedy of the Commons.39  Hardin argues that common pastures are 
prone to overuse.40  Where a village’s common green is available for the 
feeding of all the village livestock, each additional livestock that is 
added to the commons creates an additional cost that the entire village 
bears.41  If each livestock owner acts only according to his or her own 
immediate best interests and adds livestock to the commons, an 
inevitable tragedy occurs as the commons becomes increasingly 
overgrazed and is no longer able to support livestock.42  As a result of 
this tragedy of the commons, the village faces a disaster.43 
The same reasoning has been applied in the context of intellectual 
property.  Information goods are available for all to use and are 
common to society, but information is prone to overuse.  Unless fences 
are erected, common resources, such as information, will be depleted in 
precisely the same manner that common pastures are overgrazed. 
The tragedy of the commons in an economic sense is the presence of 
externalities in a given market.  Where production and consumption 
activities are not directly reflected in the market, externalities occur; as 
a result, the prices of goods do not reflect their actual social value.  
Accordingly, firms may produce too much or too little, creating market 
inefficiencies.  Property law allows market externalities to be 
internalized by the producer and allows the costs and benefits of 
activities to be reflected in the price of goods and transferred to the 
purchasers.44 
 
 39. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 40. Id. at 1244. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 
234.  Professor Hardy discusses an argument set forth by Professor Harold Demsetz that 
property rights arise when “it is a cost-effective way for land users to internalize the costs and 
benefits of the use of the land.” Id. (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property 
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Professor Mark Lemley argues that rights in intellectual property are 
being construed as forms of real property rights because real property 
rhetoric provides a strong case for exclusive rights to protectors of 
intellectual property.45  The rhetoric of real property in intellectual 
property law emphasizes that private ownership is necessary to prevent 
market externalities from occurring and allows fences to be built around 
intellectual property as a solution to the tragedy of the commons.46  
Relying on Professor Harold Demsetz’s work, Professor Lemley 
suggests that property rights may be used to limit negative externalities 
arising from transactions in the market; when the costs of these negative 
externalities become sufficiently high, the costs of introducing property 
rights into the market are justified.47  Professor Lemley goes on to argue 
that the application of the exclusionary right in real property to 
intellectual property has led the courts and commentators to argue that 
free riding—unjustly benefiting from the investment that intellectual 
property owners make in producing the work or invention—must be 
wrong and, therefore, must be removed from the system.48  Protectors of 
strong intellectual property rights argue that, when society is allowed to 
free ride on an invention or work, intellectual property owners will not 
invest sufficient resources in developing the invention or work because 
 
Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 (1967)); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Benefits:  The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1048–49 (1990).  Professor Wendy Gordon applies this reasoning to 
copyright; she speaks about the incentive to create and identifies copyright law as serving to 
provide these incentives to create.  Gordon, supra, at 1048–49.  Professor Gordon explains 
that a creator “is to be encouraged to produce by being given a right to capture a portion of 
the benefits he creates.”  Id. at 1048.  The law should allow those who contribute to cultural 
development to find incentives to create and, where the person who contributes most is a 
“creative copyist,” copyright law should reward that effort “by giving them a copyright in 
their derivative works.”  Id. at 1049. 
 45. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1031, 1037–38 (2005). 
 46. Id. at 1032. 
 47. Id. at 1037–38. 
In his classic work on the economics of property rights, Harold Demsetz argued that 
property rights are valuable in a society because they limit the creation of 
uncompensated externalities.  In a world without transaction costs, Demsetz argued, 
the creation of a clear property right will internalize the costs and benefits of an 
activity in the owner and permit the sale of that right to others who may value it 
more.  Once transaction costs are taken into account, Demsetz believed that the 
creation or alteration of property rights could be explained by asking whether the 
social gains from internalizing an externality exceeded the costs of doing so. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 48. Id. at 1032. 
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they are not allowed to capture the full social benefit of the invention.49  
The property rights in intellectual property must be strong enough that 
the social value of the invention or work does not exceed the private 
value to the creator of intellectual property.50 
Within the realm of copyright law, Professor Lemley’s arguments 
are particularly applicable.  Professor Lemley is correct to suggest that 
owners of intellectual property rights should not be entitled to capture 
the full social value of their works because it is impossible to fully 
internalize positive externalities in the marketplace.51  Full 
internalization of externalities is only as necessary as it is to recover the 
investment made.52  The tragedy of the commons does not happen in the 
realm of copyright53 where the market is one for information goods, a 
pure public good that is nonexclusive and non-rivalrous.54  An 
intellectual property owner cannot easily exclude others from benefiting 
from the work, and one person’s use of the work does not affect another 
person’s use.  And as Professor Lemley outlines, there are also severe 
costs to the grant of intellectual property rights.55 
This Article endeavors to build upon the work of Professor Lemley 
and argues that, for copyright law, it is not only impossible to internalize 
positive externalities in the market, but it is also harmful to allow for a 
complete recovery of consumer surplus.  Market inefficiencies and 
market failures should be an expected state of affairs for copyrighted 
works given that positive externalities are not reflected in the price for 
copyrighted works.56  As the markets for literary and artistic works are 
 
 49. Id. at 1031. 
 50. See id. at 1039–41. 
 51. Id. at 1046–47, 1061–64. 
 52. Id. at 1049–50. 
 53. Id. at 1050–51. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1058–59. 
These costs fall into five categories.  First, intellectual property rights distort 
markets away from the competitive norm, and therefore create static inefficiencies 
in the form of deadweight losses.  Second, intellectual property rights interfere with 
the ability of other creators to work, and therefore create dynamic inefficiencies.  
Third, the prospect of intellectual property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior 
that is socially wasteful.  Fourth, enforcement of intellectual property rights imposes 
administrative costs.  Finally, overinvestment in research and development is itself 
distortionary. 
Id. 
 56. Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property:  A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics 
Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 275–76 (1989) (discussing externalities that accompany 
public goods).  Professor Palmer explains that public goods are non-rivalrous and 
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in most circumstances inefficient and because the existence of market 
externalities is a source for market failures,57 institutional intervention 
through copyright law is necessary to correct these inefficiencies and to 
set conditions where authorship and creativity can occur. 
A.  Positive Externalities in Markets for Information Goods 
In the market for information goods, externalities occur when the 
production or consumption of literary and artistic works is not directly 
reflected in the market.58  Actions by producers and consumers of such 
works affect other copyright producers and consumers, but this is not 
accounted for in market prices.59  The presence of positive externalities, 
where society benefits from the production and consumption of a work, 
 
nonexclusive and “each person has an incentive to ‘free-ride’ off of the contributions toward 
the purchase of the good made by others.”  Id. at 275. 
 Being a public good means that the production of ideal objects entails the 
creation of external effects.  My act of publishing or in some other way revealing an 
idea, for instance, means that that ideal object is appropriable by any and all who 
wish to think it.  They receive positive externalities from my act. 
Id. at 276. 
 57. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1613. 
 Copyright markets will not, however, always function adequately.  Though the 
copyright law provided a means for excluding nonpurchasers and thus has attempted 
to cure the public goods problem, and though it has provided mechanisms to 
facilitate consensual transfers, at times bargaining may be exceedingly expensive or 
it may be impractical to obtain enforcement against non-purchasers, or other market 
flaws might preclude achievement of desirable consensual exchanges.  In those 
cases, the market cannot be relied on to mediate public interests in dissemination 
and private interests in remuneration.  In extreme instances, Congress may correct 
for market distortions by imposing a regulatory solution such as a compulsory 
licensing scheme. 
Id. 
 58. New technologies, for example, create new opportunities to use copyrighted works, 
which may not have been anticipated by the author or creator of the work, when the work 
was first introduced into the market.  When novel uses of a work by the public become 
“widespread and more visible,” it creates “substantial opportunity costs to producers” in that 
there are external gains to society that were not initially anticipated, which are, therefore, 
“gains to be internalized.”  Depoorter, supra note 13, at 35.  Litigation and lobbying for an 
extension of copyright law provides the creator of a copyrighted work with the formalities 
needed to capture the external social gains.  See id. 
 59. Alan L. Durham, Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works, 81 IND. L.J. 851, 
853–54 (2006).  According to Professor Durham, consumers have certain property rights from 
the purchase of a work, such as the right to sell, lend, or dispose of the work.  Id.  Consumers 
also have a greater ability to modify works in their homes undetected, due to the facilitation 
of new technologies.  When consumer rights are involved, other questions of “privacy, 
individual autonomy, and the privileges of ownership associated with physical property,” 
beyond an author’s right to be remunerated, become important.  Id. at 854. 
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is a given condition of the market for intellectual goods.60  The 
investment made in producing a movie creates private benefits to the 
movie producer, and, when marketed, the firm can earn a large profit to 
cover the cost of investment in producing a movie.61  However, the 
movie is also available to the public for enjoyment and viewing—
benefits that society will enjoy freely in the form of a positive 
externality.62 
For purposes of further analysis, it is instructive to return to the 
earlier cited example of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings.  The English 
writer, scholar, and philologist J.R.R. Tolkien wrote The Lord of the 
Rings and published his work in 1954 and 1955.63  By 2001, The Lord of 
the Rings had “sold over 52 million copies worldwide and ha[d] been 
translated into twenty-five different languages.”64 
 
 60. See Palmer, supra note 56, at 275 (explaining that it is neither possible nor efficient 
for a producer of public goods to exclude non-purchasing consumers).  Professor Palmer 
explains that for “a good for which the marginal cost of exclusion is greater than the marginal 
cost of provision, it is inefficient to expend resources to exclude non-purchasers.”  Id. at 275. 
 61. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412, 417 (1980).  
Justice Goettel indicates that “[a]ll of the major motion picture producers . . . are engaged in 
interstate commerce, receive annual rentals for their films in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars, and derive revenues from pay television of many millions of dollars.”  Id. 
 62. The enjoyment that the public receives from seeing movies is a form of positive 
externality, like the enjoyment of a newly painted house or newly planted flowers.  Brett M. 
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 917, 966 (2005). 
The value of public goods is realized upon consumption.  That is, upon obtaining 
access to a public good, a person consumes it and accrues benefits (value or utility).  
The production of public goods has the potential to generate positive externalities.  
Whether the benefits are external to production depends upon the conditions of 
access and the degree to which the producer internalizes the value realized by others 
upon consumption.  For example, consider a flower garden.  A person who plants 
flowers in his front yard creates the potential for positive externalities that may be 
realized by those who walk by and appreciate their beauty.  The view of the flowers 
is non-rival; consumption by one person does not deplete the view or beauty 
available for others to consume.  Consumption depends upon access, however, and 
the realization of potential externalities depends upon whether the homeowner 
builds a fence that effectively obstructs the public view.  If the homeowner builds an 
effective fence, then he has restricted access and the potential for positive 
externalities remain untapped.  If, on the other hand, the homeowner does not build 
such a fence, then people who pass by obtain access to the view, consume it, and 
realize external benefits. 
Id. 
 63. See WHITE, supra note 20, at 196, 199, 262. 
 64. Biography for J.R.R. Tolkien, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0866058/bio (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
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The measure of the private benefit (D) to Tolkien from the sales of 
his novel is reflected in the cumulative price of the fifty-two million 
copies of the novel sold.  The novel also created positive externalities in 
the form of external benefits (EB) not reflected in the price of the 
novel, including the readers’ enjoyment of the adventures of hobbits, 
wizards, dwarves, and magicians while reading the novel.  The social 
benefit (SB) of the novel is the sum of the private benefit accruing to 
Tolkien and the external benefit accruing to the readers of the novel:  
SB = D + EB. 
From 2001 to 2003, the novel was dramatized into three film parts:  
The Fellowship of the Ring (2001), The Two Towers (2002), and The 
Return of the King (2003).65  The total cost for producing the trilogy was 
$270 million.66  The three movies were a huge success, ranking as the 
eleventh, fifth, and second most successful films of all time, 
respectively.67  The movies made $2.92 billion at the worldwide box 
office.68 
The soundtrack from the movie also met with particular success.  
The film soundtrack by Canadian composer Howard Shore used a 
technique called leitmotif,69 employing recurring musical themes to 
bring out the characteristics of the people, places, and culture in the 
movies.70  Radio listeners in the United Kingdom, captivated by the 
music, voted the soundtrack as the greatest film soundtrack in a poll of 
44,000 listeners in 2003.71  Finally, in addition to movies and music, a 
massive multiplayer, online game was also developed from the novel.72 
In this case, the positive externalities spinning off from the novel are 
considerable.  Ideas that generate the production of derivative works 
are externalities that are not captured in the price of the novel—
consumer surplus is created from the uncompensated positive 
 
 65. The Lord of the Rings Film Trilogy, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_ 
Lord_of_the_Rings_film_trilogy (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 665 (10th ed. 1998); see also 
Leitmotif, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leitmotif (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 70. See Music of The Lord of the Rings Film Trilogy, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Music_of_The_Lord_of_the_Rings_film_trilogy (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 71. Ring Music Is “Best Ever,” BBC NEWS, Aug. 24, 2003,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/ 
entertainment/ 3177815.stm. 
 72. EA, Battle for Middle-Earth II, http://www.ea.com/official/lordoftherings/bfme2/ 
us/home.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
NG ARTICLE  
352 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
externalities that arise from the production of the novel.73  However, as 
long as sufficient returns are made to cover the costs of producing the 
novel together with reasonable profits accruing to the author, it does not 
matter that society may place more value on the novel than the price 
paid for it.  The externalities—in other words, the additional costs that 
society will pay in order to enjoy the novel—need not be accounted for 
or internalized by the author in order for the author to recover the 
investment made in the novel.74  To allow internalization of all the 
benefits to society from the production of the novel would allow the 
author to claim a share in the successes of the subsequent movies, music, 
and online games.  In other words, for purposes of this example, 
allowing full internalization of external benefits would enable Tolkien 
to claim ownership over the entire spectrum of creative production. 
It is correct that allowing the full internalization of externalities will 
create monopolies, as Professor Lemley points out.75  However, allowing 
the full internalization of externalities will also affect how copyrighted 
works are created and produced.  If the first producer of a creative work 
is entitled to capture all consumer surpluses, authorship and the 
generation of derivative works from the first producer will be stifled as 
the first producer seeks to increase returns on investment in the first 
work. 
B.  Information Goods:  The Cause of Market Failures 
Competitive markets fail for several reasons.  In a circumstance in 
which a producer or supplier of a good has market power, the producer 
 
 73. Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property:  The Tenuous Connections Between 
Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 439–40 (2005).  Professor Sterk, in discussing 
copyright externalities, speaks of the external benefits to consumers when copyrighted works 
are widely disseminated.  Id. 
Intellectual works have the potential to generate network effects.  The greater the 
circulation of a work of art or literature, the more valuable the work becomes in 
facilitating social and professional discourse.  If I were the only person to read a 
novel or see a movie, I would have no one with whom I could discuss the work.  
Each additional consumer of the work creates value for me—value external to the 
demand curve faced by the publisher.  The network effect exists (in different 
manifestations) for all intellectual works.  If all students in a law school class are 
familiar with the work of Locke or Coase, I would be able to explore some issues 
more effectively than if only a fraction of the students are familiar with those works.  
If students learn more as a result, the benefit will be felt by their clients—not by the 
owner of the intellectual works of Locke or Coase. 
Id. 
 74. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 592. 
 75. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1047. 
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or supplier may choose to produce fewer goods at higher prices or 
receive higher prices for less output.76  When this occurs, the market is 
inefficient because an efficient market requires firms to make the same 
pricing decisions in output production as consumers make in 
consumption decisions.77  Markets may also fail when consumers do not 
have accurate or adequate information about market prices or product 
quality.78  Inaccurate or inadequate information may lead to producing 
too much or too little of a product, leading consumers to make 
uninformed decisions about the product and prevent some markets 
from developing.79 
For the market for information goods, the market fails for two 
reasons.  First, markets may fail because of the presence of externalities 
where market prices do not reflect the activities of producers and 
consumers.  Second, failure may result because information is 
essentially a public good, and once it is provided to consumers, it is 
difficult to prevent others from thereafter consuming.80  Markets can, 
therefore, sometimes undersupply public goods.81 
Externalities contribute toward market failures because benefits, 
which accrue to other parties, are not captured within the market for the 
good.82  The benefits from the derivative works of Tolkien’s novel are 
not reflected in the market for the novel even though the production of 
that work gave rise to the production of three films, a soundtrack, and 
an online game.  However, as discussed above, the extension of property 
 
 76. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 592. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1611. 
 Books . . . exhibit certain public goods characteristics.  Once the literary 
work . . . is made available to the public, the sequence of words or the discovery 
might be used by countless consumers without exhausting the supply.  Any number 
of persons can simultaneously use the newly invented process or reprint the 
literature without physically depriving others of use. 
Id.  Professor Gordon further discusses cases of market failure and states that 
[w]hen . . . works yield such “external benefits,” the market cannot be relied upon as 
a mechanism for facilitating socially desirable transactions. 
 In cases of externalities, then, the potential owner may wish to produce socially 
meritorious new works by using some of the copyright owner’s material, yet be 
unable to purchase permission because the market structure prevents him from 
being able to capitalize on the benefits to be realized. 
Id. at 1630–31. 
 81. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 593. 
 82. Id. at 592–93. 
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rights to allow for the private internalization of these externalities is not 
only unnecessary but also harmful to the creative process and 
authorship of derivative works. 
Introducing private property rights to encourage private bargaining 
between the affected parties has been said to address these externalities 
by protecting the goods from interference by others.83  To a large extent, 
the law has addressed the failure of the market for information goods 
and derivatives.84  The derivative right under copyright corrects market 
failures by providing the right to make derivative works.85  The three 
films, the soundtrack, and online games are derived from Tolkien’s 
work, and the production of these new works would have to have been 
the subject of private bargaining between Tolkien’s estate and the 
producers of these new works.  Private negotiations allow consumer 
surplus to be captured and internalized to reflect the benefits accruing 
to society.86 
Information goods are also public goods that are non-rivalrous and 
nonexclusive.87  As information goods are non-rivalrous and 
nonexclusive, the marginal cost of providing the good to an additional 
consumer is negligible and society’s consumption of the good cannot be 
excluded.88  This allows externalities and free riding to occur and makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, for the market to price and provide 
information goods efficiently.89  When a large part of society benefits 
from the good, private bargaining through rights provided under 
copyright may not be an effective way to correct failures in the market.  
In such cases, private ordering of rights may be necessary to ensure that 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Gordon, supra note 9, at 1613. 
 85. Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related 
Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 321 (2005). 
[I]n a world without the derivative right, unauthorized derivative works will tend to 
be close substitutes for the authorized derivative works.  And they will tend to be 
even closer substitutes for other unauthorized derivative works.  Thus, sales of 
unauthorized derivative works are more likely than sales of original works to come 
at the expense of other works, and there will be an incentive that nudges authors 
toward inefficiently high levels of imitation. 
Id. 
 86. See Palmer, supra note 56, at 291–92 (discussing private contractual and other legal 
remedies to internalize externalities, such as bailments to retain ownership of a work, 
performance bonds, and trade association agreements). 
 87. See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 88. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 37, at 644–45. 
 89. Id. at 644–47. 
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those who value the goods most would be willing to pay for the good, 
thereby ensuring that information goods are continuously produced. 
In the context of online gaming as applied in The Lord of the Rings 
example, the online community of gamers, which is built on the Internet 
for massive multiplayer, role-playing games, would likely be willing to 
pay the value of the game only when there are technologies that allow 
exclusivity of the gaming community playing the game.90  Through 
technologies that prevent gamers from playing the game without paying 
for the service through a subscription, game producers will be more 
likely and willing to provide that service.91  In fact, Professor Lessig has 
outlined this very point:  the architecture of the Internet can be changed 
and private ordering of rights through codes will change the interaction 
among individuals over the Internet.92 
Markets for information goods fail because the nature of 
information goods creates externalities that cannot be fully 
internalized.93  Through law and private ordering of rights, some market 
inefficiencies are corrected.94  Through law, investments made in 
producing creative works can be recovered and producers may recover 
the average costs of production.95  Through private ordering of rights 
facilitated by technologies, producers can ensure that they are able to 
recover production costs for the good to the extent that the value in the 
good is captured.96  However, the question of where the balance should 
 
 90. See Frischmann, supra note 62, at 943–44. 
 91. See Press Release, Mythic Entm’t, Mythic Entertainment Embraces Digital 
Distribution for Dark Age of Camelot (Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.mythic 
entertainment.com/press/dr_digital_dist_sep_30.html. 
 92. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 20–21.  In virtual worlds—worlds that are connected 
through networks like the Internet—communities form online, and each person controls a 
character in real space and real time.  The online world is built by the characters that live in it, 
called “Avatars.”  See id.  Professor Lessig explains this as follows: 
Avatar space is “regulated” though the regulation is special.  In Avatar space, 
regulation comes through code.  The rules in Avatar space are imposed, not through 
sanctions, and not by the state, but by the very architecture of the particular space.  
A law is defined, not through a statute, but through a code that governs the space. 
Id. at 20. 
 93. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1631–32. 
 94. See id.  The fair use doctrine is an example of the intervention of law when markets 
fail to provide for consensual transfers. 
 95. John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost 
Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1077–78 (2005).  Professor Duffy explains that “[i]n a market 
economy with free flow of capital, those who invest resources in intellectual property creation 
will, on average, always expect to recover their fixed costs of producing their intellectual 
property—no less and no more.”  Id. 
 96. Depoorter, supra note 13, at 25.  Professor Depoorter, speaking in the context of 
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be set to ensure that the private right captures the value of the good and 
does not go beyond capture of product value to wealth transfer from the 
user to the producer remains unanswered. 
C.  Correction of Market Failures Through Institutional Intervention 
The correction of market failures in the markets for information 
goods must be made through intellectual property law.  For the 
purposes of literary and artistic works, copyright law provides the 
institutional intervention to correct the inefficiencies created from 
consumer surplus that are not internalized by the producer.97  The 
reproduction right—preventing the reproduction of the work—captures 
the value of a work by limiting uses of the work.98  A user who pays a 
price for the purchase of a novel is not entitled to make copies of the 
book without the author’s permission because the novel price does not 
include a right to make copies of the work.99  A purchaser of a book has 
the ability to make copies of the book and sell the copies, creating a 
benefit that is not within the market for the book, itself.  Similarly, 
distributing a novel without the author’s permission constitutes an 
action that is not accounted for in the market price for the novel.  
Without the recognition of the distribution right of copyright, producers 
of literary and artistic works will not be able to efficiently price their 
works while users freely make copies of the works and distribute them.  
The derivative right, to a large extent, protects the producer of works 
against chains of markets that develop from the producer’s initial 
 
cyberspace, states that “intellectual property law allows content providers to internalize the 
commercial strategy between authored works and new technological means of distribution 
and presentation of information.”  Id. 
 97. See id. at 53–56 (discussing collective rights organizations as institutions to 
coordinate pricing of copyright licenses); Gordon, supra note 9, at 1600 (discussing fair use as 
an institutional correction for market failures in the market for copyrighted works); Sterk, 
supra note 73, at 426 (discussing the need for property rights to play an important role in 
neoclassical economic theory to correct inefficient markets); see also Shubha Ghosh, 
Copyright as Privatization:  The Case of Model Codes, 78 TUL. L. REV. 653 (2004) (discussing 
the function of copyright as a theory of democratic governance to encourage cultural 
production). 
 98. Durham, supra note 59, at 877 (“The purchaser of a painting, book, compact disc, or 
DVD does not acquire, automatically, the exclusive right of reproduction, performance, 
display, or adaptation.”). 
 99. See Abramowicz, supra note 85, at 326–27.  “Copyright’s reproduction right 
provided Margaret Mitchell and her publisher an incentive to ‘invest time and money in 
writing, editing, producing and promoting the popular novel, . . . knowing that no one may 
copy the work’s expressive content without their consent.’”  Id. (quoting Paul Goldstein, 
Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 
216 (1983)). 
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market and that create their own positive externalities.  When this 
occurs, the market for information goods cannot efficiently dictate a fair 
market value for the good because producers are under compensated 
for the value of the good, thereby causing too little production of the 
work.100 
Copyright law provides a market solution by affording to producers 
of literary and artistic works the ability to capture positive externalities 
to more accurately reflect the value of their works.101  It is impossible, 
for example, for Tolkien to capture all external benefits from the 
publication of his work.  Tolkien has externalized the benefits from his 
authorship and is not able to internalize the benefits to reflect the true 
value of his work.  Other producers would be able to create derivative 
works out of the novel and create new markets with new positive 
externalities that would undermine the investment in and value of the 
original work.  Where producers of literary and artistic works have 
property rights over the work, they are able to appropriate some of the 
profits that others make from using their works.  Through the property 
right, which provides producers of literary and artistic works the ability 
to recover a profit that reflects the value of their works, competitive 
markets are better able to adequately support authorship and provide 
encouragement to producers of literary and artistic works to produce 
works that the market will sustain. 
The grant of a property right to producers of literary and artistic 
works in the absolute sense, however, will have an adverse effect if 
producers have the right to determine the value and prices for their 
works.102  The distortion of markets can also occur when producers price 
their products above fair market value; in circumstances where it is 
difficult to place a value on an intangible product—such as literary and 
artistic works—there is a risk that producers will overprice their 
products and seek a return in excess of the marginal cost of 
 
 100. Palmer, supra note 56, at 275 (stating that goods of a public nature that allow for 
non-rivalrous consumption and nonexclusivity provide consumers with an incentive to free 
ride). 
 101. See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 55, 61–62 (2001). This may be done through price discrimination in the markets for 
copyrighted works.  The law regulates the relationship between a producer of copyrighted 
works and competing producers, distributors, and users. 
 102. See Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 675, 687 (1993). Professor Brennan explains that “[c]opyright, by allowing a 
copyright holder to exclude those unwilling to pay the chosen price, will exclude those who 
are willing to pay a positive price . . . but are not willing to pay the copyright holder’s price.”  
Id. 
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production.103  When this occurs, deadweight losses are created.104  The 
result of such deadweight loss is that some consumers will not be willing 
to pay more than it costs to produce the work.105  These consumers will 
either be denied access to the work or may resort to piracy to obtain the 
work at a price below the market.106 
In a market for derivatives, absolute copyright protection will also 
affect the derivative markets of the initial work.  If a producer of a work 
is given the right to control uses of ideas and imposes high licensing fees, 
the ability of new producers to produce new works will be affected.107  If 
Tolkien, for example, had the absolute right over The Lord of the Rings, 
no one else would be able to capture any benefit from making 
derivatives.  The producer of the films, Peter Jackson, would not be able 
to profit from the sale of the films and would not be able to capture any 
benefit from the movie audiences. 
Rent-seeking behavior by producers of works is also an undesired 
outcome of absolute property rights.  Producers of literary and artistic 
works may spend large amounts of money to acquire or maintain a 
monopoly position.108  An example would be to expand the term of 
 
 103. See Sterk, supra note 73, at 467. 
 Ordinarily, propertization of resources is extolled for its ability to internalize 
externalities; if a property owner can capture all external benefits created by the 
resource, the owner is more likely to use the resource efficiently.  When the 
resource is non-rival, however, complete propertization may result not in the 
capture of external benefits, but in their dissipation.  The owner will typically charge 
a positive price for the resource even though the marginal cost of distributing 
another unit is zero, resulting in a deadweight loss.  Avoiding this loss serves as a 
foundation for the doctrinal limitations on copyright protection—durational limits, 
fair use and first sale among them. 
Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1059. 
 106. Id.  This would result in “static economic inefficiency that may be great or trivial, 
depending on the intellectual property right in question.”  Id. 
 107. Abramowicz, supra note 85, at 361 (stating that derivative rights come with social 
costs); Durham, supra note 59, at 896–900 (discussing consumer modifications of copyrighted 
works and whether a copyright owner should be legally entitled to prohibit the modification 
when the purpose of the modification is to make the work more meaningful or appealing to 
the consumer). 
 108. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1063. 
The very process of government granting rights over creations encourages creators 
to petition Congress to give them still more rights. . . . This rent seeking is a cost of 
government-granted intellectual property rights.  Indeed, economic theory suggests 
that private parties will spend up to the total value of the benefit seeking to capture 
it. 
Id. at 1063–64. 
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copyright protection109 or increase the laws protecting copyrighted 
works.110  To Professor Lemley, legislative rent-seeking behaviors of this 
form are a cost of the rights provided by the government.111  
Enforcement of copyright is also expensive in terms of legal fees as well 
as time spent by courts, legislators, law enforcement officers and 
administrative agencies.112  Finally, it is harmful to extend protection 
beyond the point that is necessary to enable producers of works to 
recover their investments. 
The creation of absolute rights to allow for full control over external 
benefits from the production of works does not exist with any other 
form of property.113  If it were to be allowed in intellectual property, the 
result might end up being to encourage too much investment in 
creativity that does not resonate with other forms of production.114 
There is a balance that must be struck in order to achieve 
equilibrium in the market for information goods.  Rights must be 
sufficient in order that producers of literary and artistic works may 
recover investments made to produce the works and make sufficient 
profits to have incentives to continue to produce new works.  At the 
same time, it is important to ensure that the public is able to enjoy the 
benefits of literary and artistic authorship. 
Economic theories do not provide an adequate solution.115  The line 
between the private right to control and the public interest in accessing 
information goods remains an elusive one.116  Arriving at a single 
solution that states where the balance should be is an elusive goal given 
that there are so many variables within economic theories that would 
affect where the ideal balance should be—such variables include, among 
 
 109. In 1998, Congress extended the copyright term by twenty years by passing the 
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). 
 110. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) makes it a criminal offence to 
produce and disseminate technology that would circumvent measures taken to protect 
copyrighted works.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C).  It also increases the penalties for 
infringing copyrighted works on the Internet.  Id. 
 111. Lemley, supra note 45, at 1063–64. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Id. at 1069.  Professor Lemley suggests that “the economic arguments for property 
don’t justify the full internalization of social surplus as a general matter, but only in the 
limited circumstances of the tragedy of the commons.  The leap from property right to 
‘despotic dominion’ is not a universal one.”  Id. 
 114. Professor Lemley takes up a more thorough discussion of the costs of absolute 
intellectual property.  See id. at 1058–65. 
 115. Id. at 1065. 
 116. Id. 
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others, the type of creation, the nature of work, the market structure, 
the supply and demand of goods, the investment made in production, 
and the distribution channels.117 
Although the proper economic balance cannot be found in economic 
theories,118 law and technology scholarship has, nevertheless, shown that 
technology may provide a private solution to drawing the boundaries of 
private ownership.119  The onus on achieving a fair balance between 
private rights and public interests resides with the producers of works.120  
Therefore, the discussion must now turn to identifying how technologies 
may play a role in providing a balance for determining where copyright 
should begin and where it should end. 
II.  TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 
The development of new technologies has always affected markets 
for literary and artistic works.121  Scholars often refer to the printing 
press as the technology that gave rise to copyright as a system of rules to 
regulate printing.122  Authors began to realize the economic value of 
their works as printing presses emerged and this new technology 
allowed for works to be quickly and cheaply reproduced.123  In delivering 
 
 117. Scholarship on intellectual property has used many different points of economic 
analysis for justification.  See id. at 1075. 
 118. Id. at 1065–69. 
 119. See Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 943, 993 (1998). 
 120. There is an onus on the producers of creative works to recognize the changing 
landscape of consumption of literary and artistic works as consumers begin to exert 
personalized choices about what content to use and how they use content.  The architecture 
of the Internet provides this ability and content producers may be in the best position to 
ensure that private choices and social values are embodied in the manner they produce and 
distribute content.  Professor Lessig points out that “[w]hat people listen to and what they 
find compelling are matters of private not public choice.”  LESSIG, supra note 17, at 263. 
 121. See Brian A. Carlson, Comment, Balancing the Digital Scales of Copyright Law, 50 
SMU L. REV. 825, 827 (1997) (stating that “[t]he history of copyright law is replete with 
examples of new technology pushing the outer limits of copyright law, often to the point of 
forcing copyright law to evolve or risk becoming ineffective at promoting its underlying 
goal”). 
 122. WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (1994).  According to 
Patry, “[t]he printing press, with its ability to make multiple copies of a work easily, is 
frequently cited as the impetus for efforts to secure a more formal type of protection for 
books.”  Id. 
 123. For further information about the effect of the printing press on the early book 
reproduction trade of the fifteenth century, see Peter K. Yu, Of Monks, Medieval Scribes, and 
Middlemen, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1. 
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.,124 Justice Stevens outlined the following:   
From its beginning the law of copyright has developed as a 
response to significant changes in technology.  Indeed, it was the 
invention of a new form of copying equipment—the printing 
press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright 
protection.  Repeatedly, as new developments have occurred in 
this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new 
rules that new technology made necessary.125 
The role of technology is central to the development of copyright law. 
Technology provides producers of information goods with the ability 
to define their property rights over their works.126  Technology can 
either provide or restrict access to works, and it can either strengthen 
the position of the producer or provide greater freedom to consumers to 
use the work.127  Professor Lessig’s work illustrates how technology may 
be used to define the balance between private control and public access 
to works; he suggests that responsible use of technologies will lead 
toward greater freedom of creative expression within a reasonable 
system of property that continues to encourage authorship.128  The 
information commons—the area that comprises creative ideas and 
works that are free to the public to use and are crucially important to 
the development of new works and innovation129—must be protected 
against technological controls that erect private barriers and restrict 
public access to these building blocks of creativity and innovation. 
Technology has also provided greater freedom to society to 
participate in the creative process.  More consumers are able to capture 
the benefits from the production of creative works into their own works 
and activities, creating derivatives and market externalities of their 
 
 124. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 125. Id. at 430–31. 
 126. The networked economy presents radically different and decentralized production 
and distribution functions for the market.  Professor Benkler explains that “the networked 
information economy can be more open and admit of many more diverse possibilities for 
organizing production and consumption than could the physical economy.”  Yochai Benkler, 
Freedom in the Commons:  Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 
1247 (2003). 
 127. There are increased possibilities for peer production and joint creation of works.  
See id. at 1256. 
 128. See LESSIG, supra note 14. 
 129. See LESSIG, supra note 17, at 49.  Professor Lessig defines three aspects of the 
commons, and defines the third aspect as “the commons of innovation . . . the opportunity, 
kept open to anyone, to innovate and build upon the platform of the network.”  Id. 
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own.130  The reproduction, distribution, and derivative rights under 
copyright become more important to provide a fair market exchange so 
that producers may capture the fair market value of works and 
consumers are able to create wealth from the original productions.131  
Several things are clear from the exercise of these rights by the 
producers of creative works:  first, the balance of power between the 
producer and users will change depending on the technology that is 
available to either provide control or increase access to works; second, 
technologies are tools that will assist producers of creative works to 
grow as markets for information goods change; and third, technology 
cannot provide the balance between private control and public access to 
works.  Only copyright—as an institution of law—can fill that need. 
A.  Capturing Social Surplus in Markets for Information Goods 
We have moved past the questions of whether rights in literary and 
artistic works should be protected.  The answer to that question is a 
resounding “yes.”  This leads, though, to the question of how these 
works should be protected. 
These works should be protected to the extent that the producer of 
the work is able to recover the marginal cost of production and also 
make reasonable profits from the production as an incentive to produce.  
It is difficult and harmful to attempt to capture and internalize all 
positive externalities.  Some of these externalities will not be accounted 
for in prices for the goods.  However, where copyright law clearly 
defines property rights over the work, the producer of creative works 
may internalize some positive externalities from the production of the 
work.132  In competitive markets, this takes place through private 
bargaining between the producer and consumer of the work.133  The 
value of the work is reflected in prices set through negotiations.  
Transaction costs are incurred through the negotiations for permission 
to use the work at a fair price. 
On the Internet, technologies provide control over works that are 
not possible in real space.  An example of a control that would be 
impossible to enforce in real space is the purchase of a novel.  Professor 
 
 130. See Depoorter, supra note 13, at 27; Frischmann, supra note 62, at 1019. 
 131. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 440–41 (1984). 
 132. Gordon, supra note 44, at 1048–49; Hardy, supra note 44, at 234. 
 133. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1612–13 (discussing copyright’s role in facilitating the 
“consensual market in four ways:  it creates property rights, lowers transactions costs, 
provides valuable information, and contains mechanisms for enforcement”). 
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Lessig sets forth an example of a police officer being “sold” with each 
book to ensure that the buyer uses the book in a way consistent with 
what was agreed upon when the book was sold.134  However, the 
prohibitive costs of attaching a police officer with the sale of a book to 
monitor uses of the book will not permit differential pricing for different 
social benefits that arise from the use of the book.  For example, a 
producer may try to price a book at one dollar if the buyer agrees to 
read the book only once, and he or she will price the book at one 
hundred dollars if the buyer plans to read the book more than one 
hundred times.135  Technologies, however, permit this form of bundling 
and differential pricing to capture social surpluses in accordance with 
the value each user places on the goods.136  Media subscription services 
for information provided over the Internet are a good example of 
bundling and differential pricing to reflect the user’s value for the 
good.137  As a result of these new technologies that allow producers to 
define the boundaries of their property rights, prices of information 
goods may be set according to the value users ascribe to them—users 
who value the good more will be willing to pay more, thereby reducing 
deadweight losses in the market place. 
The benefit of technologies in the market may be secondary to the 
harm that will arise when these technologies are used by producers of 
information in two ways:  (1) to draw boundaries around information 
that rightfully should belong to the commons, and (2) to prevent the 
development of technology that allows consumers to capture positive 
externalities and benefits from the market.138  In many cases, external 
benefits are never captured and it would be harmful to society if all 
producers of information goods were to try to capture and internalize all 
positive externalities.  Professor Lessig provides the example of 
“copyright bots,” which are computer programs that scan Web pages on 
the Internet and allow content owners to identify and request sites that 
 
 134. LESSIG, supra note 14, at 127–30. 
 135. See id. at 128. 
 136. See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?  Economic Analysis, Price 
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2024–25 (2000) 
(discussing the technologies that may be used to bundle and price discriminate based on a 
consumer’s ability and willingness to pay). 
 137. See Meurer, supra note 101, at 72.  Professor Meurer explains how “[s]ellers 
measure preferences by observing buyers’ choices.”  Id. 
 138. Reverse engineering, for example, is a positive externality in the form of 
competition by a potential inventor and market entrant.  See Mark A. Lemley, The 
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1057 (1997). 
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contain potentially infringing materials to be shut down.139  For example, 
EMI requested that an online guitar archive, which hosted a site to 
allow guitar hobbyists to exchange chord sequences, be shut down 
because of potential copyright infringement.140  The difficulties of 
tracking and internalizing externalities in real space do not apply to the 
Internet, and the potential for drawing boundaries around market 
activities that are rightfully public and external to the market for the 
information goods is substantially increased, thereby extending rights 
beyond the necessary limits, and the producers of information goods are 
able to transfer wealth from the public to themselves. 
Attempts to capture consumer surplus in the market for information 
goods also have the potential effect of displacing intermediaries or 
information carriers, which provide content to users on the Internet. 
The decision in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. did precisely that.141  
In Napster, an Internet start-up company, which allowed its users to 
exchange music files, was shut down.142  The software that Napster 
developed provided an online community with a service that enabled 
users to share and exchange files, including MP3s and music files in an 
audio format, through a central server.143  The software created an 
extensive network that allowed people to enjoy and share their favorite 
music, not unlike two friends exchanging music that they enjoy.144  On 
the Internet, however, this form of market activity was regarded as an 
activity that the law did not permit.145  Record companies were allowed 
to internalize positive externalities from potential markets—markets 
that the recording companies had not yet captured.  Evidence that there 
was a substantial likelihood that Napster would adversely affect the 
potential market for copyrighted works was accepted by Judge Patel 
based on a claim that three general types of harm would occur if the 
Napster software were to be allowed:  “a decrease in retail sales, 
especially among college students; an obstacle to the . . . plaintiff’s 
future entry into the digital downloading market; and a social devaluing 
of music stemming from its free distribution.”146  Recording companies 
 
 139. LESSIG, supra note 17, at 180–83. 
 140. Id. at 182–83. 
 141. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), 
aff’d, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. at 906. 
 144. Id. at 905–08. 
 145. Id. at 927. 
 146. Id. at 914. 
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may suffer these effects, but this does not justify the expansion of 
property rights. 
Consumer surplus should only be captured within existing markets, 
and rights should not be expanded to markets that do not yet exist or 
which the information good producer has not yet entered.  Rights must 
be exercised within existing markets and within existing boundaries that 
clearly define property rights.  In Sony,147 the Supreme Court dealt with 
a novel and new technology—the videocassette recorder (VCR)—by 
considering largely the general societal benefits, which the new 
technology brought.148  The Court regarded these benefits as far 
outweighing the more nebulous claim by the copyright owner that the 
use of the VCR crossed “invisible boundaries” of control that copyright 
owners have over their programs.149  Regarding the use of the VCR for 
home time-shifting purposes to be a fair use of a copyright owner’s 
content, the Supreme Court emphasized the requirement that the 
copyright owner demonstrate some likelihood of harm before a private 
act of time-shifting is to be condemned as a violation of federal law.150  
Justice Stevens, however, in delivering the majority opinion of the 
Court, recognized that this may be a right that Congress did not intend 
for the copyright owners.151  It was not the job of the courts, Justice 
Stevens reasoned, to apply laws that had not been written.152  In other 
words, providers of information goods must only capture consumer 
surplus within existing markets. 
 
 147. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 148. Id. at 454. 
 149. See id. at 456.  While nuances in perceptions and points of philosophy are 
understandable, the district court did not think there was justification for an injunction 
against the use of the VCR.  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 
429, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 
U.S. 417 (1984).  The district court determined that harm from time-shifting was speculative 
and minimal.  Id. 
 150. Sony, 464 U.S. at 454. 
 151. Id. at 456. 
 One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected 
representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have made 
it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat 
prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible. 
Id. 
 152. See id. 
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B.  Correction of Market Failures Through Technologies 
Markets for information goods will always fail precisely because of 
externalities that prevent adequate expression of benefits to society in 
price and economic decision making by producers of information goods.  
Recognizing private property rights in information goods is one way to 
encourage private producers to fund the production of these goods—
goods that are essentially nonexclusive and non-rivalrous.153  
Technologies have a significant role in correcting these failures and 
improving efficiencies in the market.  One of the most significant 
technological developments is the Internet, where the potential to 
connect authors to their audience is unlimited.  The inefficiency of 
markets for information goods can be corrected when technologies are 
used to ensure that producers of information goods work under proper 
conditions to encourage authorship and society has access to works that 
are essential toward social development and growth.  Through the 
proper balance between private property and the public interest, 
information goods may be efficiently produced and allocated in the 
market. 
The economics of creative production has always been dependent on 
the technologies that allowed cheaper copies of a literary and artistic 
work to be made and distributed to a far wider audience.  The more 
copies made and the more people to whom the work is distributed, the 
greater the revenue for the producer.154  Just as the printing press long 
ago altered the economics of information goods production, the Internet 
has altered the economics for information goods production of this age.  
Unlike prior technologies, the Internet now provides the ability for 
producers of information goods to privately order their rights to 
maximize revenue from the public.  Media subscription services allow 
information to be bundled, packaged, and suited to the consumer’s 
preferences.  As many as one million consumers subscribe to online 
gaming services to be part of a virtual community.155  Individual tracks of 
music may be downloaded or streamed from an online music provider, 
and the purchase of films has also become possible through the Internet.  
The media information distributor, motion picture companies, and 
 
 153. Gordon, supra note 44, at 1048–49; Hardy, supra note 44, at 234; Palmer, supra 
note 56, at 275–76. 
 154. See Depoorter, supra note 13, at 35–36. 
 155. The combined global membership of subscription and non-subscription games 
exceeds fifteen million.  See Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG), 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MMORPG (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
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sound recording companies have been displaced, and authors, 
themselves, are now directly connected to the consumers of their 
literary and artistic works. 
Professor Paul Goldstein portended the changes that copyright 
markets would face with the Internet twelve years ago.156  He wrote 
about a “celestial jukebox,” a metaphor for the technological 
possibilities for copyright markets in the future.157  The celestial jukebox 
is a “technology-packed satellite orbiting thousands of miles above 
Earth, awaiting a subscriber’s order”158 to connect the subscriber to a 
storehouse of information and content that the subscriber will pay for 
and receive.159  When this metaphor was first conceived, its 
infrastructure was a figment of imagination, but today, the Internet has 
brought the celestial jukebox metaphor to life. 
Professor Goldstein’s foresight of the changes technology would 
bring to the market for information goods has proved quite accurate.  
First, Professor Goldstein suggested that “the celestial jukebox may 
reduce transaction costs of negotiating licenses . . . for complete 
works . . . [and] for small fragments as well.”160  He foresaw the 
emergence of technologies to enable copyright owners to charge users 
differently in accordance to the value of each element of a work that is 
used.161  The capacity of the celestial jukebox to charge subscribers for 
access and to shut a service off if the subscriber fails to pay the bills162 is 
evident in the current practices of music streaming subscription services 
and online music catalogues like Rhapsody, among others.163  Second, 
Professor Goldstein foresaw the greater role authors would play in the 
market for literary and artistic works and the lessening role that book 
publishers and motion picture and record producers would have in the 
market.164  Today, this may be seen in the rise of the many independent 
musicians and composers who have made their music available to the 
 
 156. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY:  FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 199 (1994). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 223–24. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. at 224. 
 163. See, e.g., Welcome on Rhapsody, http://www.rhapsody.com/welcome (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2007). 
 164. GOLDSTEIN, supra note156, at 234–35. 
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public through online independent music communities with free hosting 
of independent music, such as GarageBand.com.165 
The reduction of transaction costs as license negotiations become 
more efficient between producers of information goods and users, as 
well as the displacement of the distributor of content by Internet 
technologies and networks, contribute toward correcting market 
inefficiencies for literary and artistic works.  New technologies, 
especially the connectivity facilitated by networks on the Internet, have 
contributed to a more efficient market for literary and artistic works.166  
However, it is also important to note that the celestial jukebox will not 
entirely replace traditional copyright markets.  In traditional copyright 
markets, the law is the primary institution to provide an efficient 
outcome between private rights and the public interest. 
C.  Copyright as an Institution for Balancing Private Control and Public 
Access 
The balance between private control and public access is important 
in copyright law because the underlying purpose for the grant of 
property rights in literary and artistic works is to promote education and 
learning within society from the availability of literary and artistic 
works.167  Harkening back to the origins of copyright law, the Statute of 
Anne was intended to impose the burden of literary and artistic 
production upon booksellers in order to meet the public interest for 
learning.168  Within today’s copyright framework, the property rights 
granted by the law cannot be absolute in the sense that producers may 
impose prices that go beyond the fair value that consumers would be 
willing to pay.  Some externalities in the market will have to remain 
external to the market and cannot be internalized.169  In Donaldson v. 
 
 165. GarageBand.com, http://www.garageband.com (last visited Apr. 20, 2007). 
 166. See Burk, supra note 119, at 948. 
 167. See Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). 
 168. See Craig W. Dallon, The Problem with Congress and Copyright Law:  Forgetting 
the Past and Ignoring the Public Interest, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365, 409 (2004). 
[T]he Statute of Anne . . . had as its foremost objective, the encouragement of 
learning—a general public interest—not the private economic interests of authors, 
printers or publishers.  It did have a secondary interest for the economic security of 
authors and other proprietors of books and writings, but this secondary concern was 
driven by the impact that the void of regulation had upon the creation of “useful 
books.” 
Id. 
 169. See Frischmann, supra note 62, at 988–89. 
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Beckett, decided by the House of Lords,170 Lord Camden made a similar 
observation, mentioning that producers cannot maintain monopolistic 
prices over literary and artistic works; if that were to occur, then “[a]ll 
our learning will be locked upon in the hands of the Tonsons and the 
Lintons of the age, who will set what price upon it their avarice chuses 
to demand, till the public become as much their slaves, as their own 
hackney compilers are.”171 
Two aspects of copyright law are particularly important in balancing 
private rights and the public interest.  The first—the fair use doctrine—
is codified in § 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act.172  The doctrine outlined 
in § 107 provides guidelines to assist courts in determining fair use,173 
and courts have regarded the four factors outlined therein as being 
equally important in undertaking an analysis of fair use.174  According to 
Professor Wendy Gordon, fair use is employed to “permit 
uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of 
effectuation through the market.”175  When markets do not function 
effectively to allocate resources among individuals—as is the case, for 
example, when “the markets fail to generate economically desirable 
outcomes when using the market process would threaten other social 
goals”—other modes of resource control will be employed by the legal, 
economic, or social system to reallocate resources.176  The fair use 
doctrine, which is the “judicial response to market failure in the 
copyright context,”177 serves to allocate resources between the copyright 
owner and users when it is otherwise impossible for users to obtain 
authorization from copyright owners for the use of the work. 
 
 170. Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).  Donaldson v. Beckett 
established the precedent that the Statute of Anne prevailed over common law property 
rights.  Id.  Rights and remedies attached to a work were to be determined under statutory 
provisions.  See PATRY, supra note 122, at 13–14; see also LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 175 (1968). 
 171. Donaldson, 1 Eng. Rep. 837; L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE 
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT:  A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 42 (1991). 
 172. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
 173. Id.  Factors to be considered in determining fair use are the purpose and character 
of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
 174. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 21 (1992). 
 175. Gordon, supra note 9, at 1601. 
 176. See id. at 1605. 
 177. See id. 
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Fair use, however, may have very little application for activities 
taking place on the online market for information goods.178  Precisely 
because direct contact is possible between users and producers of 
information goods, transaction costs to obtain permission for use is 
substantially reduced and, hence, there is very little place for 
exemptions in the law, including the application of the fair use 
doctrine.179  However, the application of the doctrine in real space has 
important effects—resources may be efficiently allocated and wealth 
distributed between private and public interests.  The implication of 
applying fair use in real space is pivotal to the public’s use of 
information goods for purposes such as research, education, and 
building new works from existing ones. 
The fair use doctrine will better serve to balance private rights and 
public interests if the doctrine is construed with the public interest aim 
in mind.  The four factors to be considered under § 107 do not take into 
account the interests of society in producing new works from old ones 
and in using literary and artistic works for the purposes of education and 
growth.180  The public interest in having access to works is not read into 
the framework of § 107.181  Indeed, this point was made by Professor 
Shubha Ghosh when he noted that fair use analysis has always been 
framed to resolve conflicts between two private rights holders.182  In 
Sony, the doctrine was applied between the motion picture producers 
and the VCR producer.183  In Napster, fair use was applied between the 
recording companies and the software producer.184  In neither case was 
the right of the public a consideration in determining whether the use of 
the work was fair or not.185  In both cases, the analysis focused on the 
effect of the new technology on the market and economics of the 
creative content business.186  Professor Ghosh argues for a fair use 
construction that does not place the market as the central point of 
analysis.187  He argues that markets are just one part of the equation that 
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strikes the balance in copyright.188  Other institutions that disseminate 
information goods to the public, such as libraries and universities, must 
play a role along with markets to determine the effect of an act upon the 
public.189 
Professor Ghosh’s argument is a compelling one.  In the search for a 
balance between private rights and public interests, Professor Ghosh 
argues that copyright law is a form of privatization190—the government’s 
way of getting authors to produce literary and artistic works for the 
public.  If that is the case, then there is a need to understand that public 
good underlies the law and that there may be a need to de-privatize 
copyright law in order to achieve the public good.191  Literary and artistic 
works are not purely private artifacts to be protected by property rights 
as an entitlement.192  Rather, the grant of a right serves a larger purpose:  
literary and artistic production for society’s ultimate benefit.  
Construing copyright as a form of privatization shifts our focus from 
economics or technology as the primary tools for achieving a balance 
between private rights and public interests. 
As has been argued in this Article, economic theories and 
technological developments show that there must be a balance between 
private and public interests, but neither offers answers to where the 
balance should be set.  Conceiving of copyright as a system of 
privatization permits the insertion of public values in copyright analysis, 
including fair use.  This is particularly important when technologies 
have made consumers of literary and artistic works into producers of 
new or derivative works.  If technologies have made markets perfect 
and transaction costs zero, the conception of fair use with the public 
interest will allow the public to use literary and artistic works for 
purposes of education, growth, and research. 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. at 489–91. 
 190. See id. at 484. 
 191. See id. at 390. 
 192. See id. at 413. 
Copyright debates in the nineteenth century were infused with questions of 
democratic values and representation, particularly as the freedoms of press and 
speech were implicated.  Copyright’s development in the twentieth century and 
current debates over copyright and developing countries are intimately connected to 
the establishment of accountable government institutions and reliable, independent 
media.  Copyright theory has intimate links with broader theories of democratic 
governance. 
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The second aspect of copyright that ensures public access to literary 
and artistic works is the idea of originality and the idea-expression 
dichotomy.  The U.S. Copyright Act expressly provides that ideas are 
ineligible for copyright protection193 and the courts have consistently 
affirmed the freedom of the public to use ideas underlying works to 
produce new and creative works.194  In Baker v. Selden,195 a system of 
ruled lines and headings was used to illustrate a method of bookkeeping 
and the Supreme Court had to answer the question of whether 
copyright existed in the system of bookkeeping if there was copyright in 
the book, itself.196  While it was clear that the book conveyed 
information on the subject of bookkeeping and contained detailed 
explanations of the art of bookkeeping, it was more evident to the Court 
that there was a clear distinction between the book and the art that it 
was intended to illustrate.197  Novelty in the art expressed in the book 
should be protected through the patent system.198  “To give to the author 
of the book an exclusive property in the art [through copyright],” when 
no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be to 
fraud the public.199  Unless a patent was obtained for the art contained 
within the book, the public should be able to have access to the ideas 
contained in the book.200  Copyright in the book was separate from the 
ideas in it.201  While the public cannot print and publish the book or any 
material in it, the bookkeeping system therein was an art that the public 
could use and practice.202 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. 
Rural Telephone Service Co.203 reflected a more definitive approach to 
the question of originality.  The Court denied copyright protection to 
compilations of facts unless the compiled facts, by their selection and 
arrangement, displayed the requisite originality necessary to protect the 
 
 193. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  Again, the Copyright Act states that “[i]n no case does 
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, 
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in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”  Id. 
 194. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 195. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See id. at 102. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. Id. at 103. 
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compilation under copyright laws.204  In Feist, the Court had to decide if 
copyright protection could exist for the publication of a typical 
telephone directory that consisted of white pages and yellow pages.205  
The Court held that there is a copyright in the directory as a whole 
because it contains some forward text and some original material in the 
yellow pages.206  However, the white pages were not protected because 
that material did not meet the prerequisite of originality required for 
protection.207  “Sweat of the brow” was not a sufficient justification for 
the grant of a copyright in the work—a copyright may not be earned 
merely as a reward for the hard work accompanying the compilation of 
facts.208  The Court held, however, that the grant of a copyright in factual 
compilations is possible in situations where the facts are selected, 
coordinated, and arranged in such a manner that they satisfy the 
originality requirement.209  To the Court, “[o]riginality requires only that 
the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e., 
without copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and 
that it display some minimal level of creativity.”210  In this case, the 
selection of names, towns, and telephone numbers to fill up the white 
pages was “devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity” and was, 
therefore, unable to qualify for copyright protection.211  Although there 
was sufficient effort exerted to make the white pages directory useful, 
there was insufficient creativity to make the directory an original 
work.212  The Court went on to make it clear that “copyright rewards 
originality, not effort.”213 
The idea-expression dichotomy, however, may not provide a 
complete solution to balancing the private and public interests in 
copyright.  Professor Amy Cohen argues that the idea-expression 
dichotomy does not sit comfortably in copyright law because it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate ideas from the expression of a 
work.214  To provide protection for expressions of creativity in works and 
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to make the underlying ideas available to the public as building blocks 
of creativity may not be possible because new artists may find it difficult 
to extract the “idea” without the “expression” of an existing work.215  On 
this argument, it is said that the idea-expression dichotomy cannot 
provide an objective framework for the courts to separate parts of a 
work that ought to be protected in favor of the author and parts of the 
work that ought to fall within the public domain.216  Without an objective 
or philosophical basis to distinguish ideas from expressions in works of 
art, an assessment of ideas from expressions will be a subjective 
determination based on a judge’s artistic value of the work.217  However, 
we may refer back to copyright law as an institution to further the public 
good in addressing what should constitute free ideas and what should be 
protected as expressions.  Parts of works that society can use as building 
blocks to further education, learning, and growth should be made 
available as ideas.  The test of what constitutes free ideas is whether the 
idea can be used in another work without seeming like the original 
expression.  Putting ruled lines in a book for accounting purposes, for 
example, is an idea that will prevent society from benefiting if it is 
exclusively protected.  Plots of plays, story lines, and research findings 
are ideas that society should be able to use.218  The way these ideas are 
communicated to the public and the manner in which plots, story lines, 
and music are expressed to capture society’s attention and imagination 
are justifiably expressions to be protected to encourage creative 
authorship. 
Fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy allow institutional 
intervention into markets for information goods to ensure that rights 
holders do not extend rights into realms of the public where literary and 
 
Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990). 
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 216. Id. at 219. 
 217. Id. at 231–32. 
 218. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990).  Professor 
Litman addresses the fundamental building blocks of ideas, which inspire the production of 
literary and artistic works.  She describes the process of creation as follows: 
[c]omposers recombine sounds they have heard before; playwrights base their 
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artistic works are needed.  Technologies, particularly the Internet, have 
redefined copyright markets and made bundling, differential pricing, 
and media subscription services tools to correct market failings where 
prices of goods have not been accurately reflective of the values 
consumers place on literary and artistic works.  Transaction costs are 
almost zero, and fair use, which has been the judiciary’s response to 
failing content markets, may no longer serve a purpose in correcting 
market inefficiencies.219  The only way to ensure that private rights do 
not overwhelm public interests is through copyright as an institution to 
encourage authorship for public benefits.  In the concluding paragraph 
of Copyright’s Highway, Professor Goldstein expresses that “[t]he main 
challenge will be to keep . . . [copyright’s] trajectory clear of the buffets 
of protectionism and true to copyright’s historic logic that the best 
prescription for connecting authors to their audiences is to extend rights 
into every corner where consumers derive value from literary and 
artistic works.”220  Rights are important to encourage authorship and 
respect for copyright as an institution.221  These rights must encourage 
authors to produce literary and artistic works first before the public 
interest can be met.  Nonetheless, it is equally important to recognize 
the rights as serving an end—that of providing literary and artistic works 
for the public’s benefit.  Internalizing every benefit in society from the 
production of literary and artistic works is not the intent of copyright 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
Consumers and the public in general derive value from the creation 
of literary and artistic works—we must recognize that authorship is the 
primary activity that contributes to this benefit.  Private rights may be 
the most feasible manner to encourage authorship.  Through the 
guarantee that investments in producing works will be recovered, 
authors are more inclined to engage in creative production, even though 
there may be ancillary reasons to engage in these forms of activities, 
such as deriving satisfaction from producing art and being able to 
contribute to the greater societal good.  Realistically, however, authors 
must be remunerated for their work.  The patronage system of 
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remunerating authors for their works is arguably still intact; the 
production of creative works, however, has just been delegated to 
private firms.222  In any event, the intent remains the same:  literary and 
artistic works are to be produced for the public interest. 
The grant of property rights with the underlying purpose of 
furthering general social goals of learning and education comes with its 
challenges.  The nature of information, being public and essentially non-
rivalrous and non-exclusive (particularly in real space), creates market 
externalities that cannot and should not be fully internalized by the 
producer.223  Some consumer surplus will not be captured and free riding 
will occur.  However, these should be acceptable market conditions for 
information goods.  Copyright addresses these inefficiencies and, to a 
large extent, corrects them.  Technologies have also contributed 
significantly to correcting market failures in markets for information 
goods.  Exemptions in law, such as fair use, may have very little effect in 
addressing market failures because the networks of the Internet build 
connections between producers and users for consensual bargaining to 
take place. 
The law matters, however, because in real space, a large segment of 
society does not have access to creative works and information for 
development and growth.224  There is an increasing global awareness that 
information and knowledge are necessary for development and 
progress.  An example is the Access to Knowledge (A2K) movement 
that has contributed to the understanding that the law is not merely an 
instrument for protecting private interests225 but is also an instrument 
that can provide access to works that will benefit developing 
communities around the globe.  The law matters because it serves to 
foster larger social goals through the grant of private property rights.  
By encouraging private firms to produce literary and artistic works 
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through property rights, larger social goals will be fulfilled.  Ultimately, 
copyright’s empire is not about how far property rights should extend, 
but rather how to encourage and support the proper conditions for 
authorship to flourish. 
Copyright’s empire is not as much about entitlement as it is about 
values.  The law matters because without the proper balance between 
private and public interests, society’s needs cannot be met.  Copyright’s 
empire is about two things:  authorship and society.  There must be 
proper conditions that will encourage authors to produce literary and 
artistic works.  Without rights provided by the law, authorship will not 
flourish.  The connections authors make with their consumers to 
provide works that society values will not happen without a market-
based system of resource allocation.  Importantly, literary and artistic 
works are also the main sources for education and growth necessary in 
order for society to develop.  Without these works, society will reach a 
standstill in the process of development.  Society will stagnate the 
moment the production of literary and artistic works ceases.  The law 
must ensure that society continues to have materials to develop.  This 
can only be done through a system connected to society via free market 
supply and demand mechanics. 
Ultimately, copyright’s empire is vast.  It begins with the recognition 
that private rights are important, and it ends with the acceptance that 
society’s goals are indefinite.  Only through rights protected by law can 
we meet the goals defined by society. 
 
